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HEDGE FUND REGULATION:
A PROPOSAL TO MAINTAIN HEDGE FUNDS’
EFFECTIVENESS WITHOUT SEC
REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
American hedge funds hold $1.7 trillion in assets.1 In 2002, this figure
was a far-more paltry $560 billion.2 In the same period, annual gross
domestic product (GDP) rose from $10.05 trillion to $11.3 trillion.3 As a
percentage of GDP, hedge fund assets under management have increased
from 5.6% to 15% in the past four years.4
This growth mirrored an improving economy after the stock market
slump from the end of 2000 to 2002,5 and far exceeds the growth of mutual
funds or the equity markets as a whole.6 Funds that invest in other hedge
funds to spread risk, called funds of funds,7 have increased hedge fund
accessibility for those who do not meet the investment thresholds traditional
hedge funds usually require.8 Funds of funds also add liquidity for investors
who are unable or unwilling to lock up substantial assets based on the terms
required by each underlying fund.9
The burgeoning hedge fund industry brought with it several highprofile fund collapses. These collapses have resulted from risky investment
strategies, questionable standards of ethical trading and extreme leveraging
of assets.10 The effect of these collapses and the perceived growing threat of
a hedge fund industry accounting for an increasingly large share of the
economy led the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to draft and

1. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, SEC and FBI Bare Teeth at Hedge Funds, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Sept. 27, 2006, at 1.
2. Donna Rosato, Investing; Hedge Funds for All? Well, Not Quite, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2002, § 3, at 36.
3. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT-DOLLAR AND
“REAL” GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (2006), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/
gdplev.xls [hereinafter U.S. GDP].
4. GDP dollar amounts are in real terms and reflect U.S. dollars in 2000.
5. NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUS. CYCLE DATING COMM., THE NBER’S
BUSINESS-CYCLE DATING PROCEDURE 1–2 (2003), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/
recessions.pdf.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. Hedge funds typically have a minimum investment of $1,000,000. INV. CO. INST., THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUTUAL FUNDS AND HEDGE FUNDS (2005), available at
http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs_hedge.html [hereinafter ICI].
9. On top of existing hedge fund fees, see infra Part III.B, funds of funds charge an additional
1% management fee and, possibly, a performance fee of up to 5% on return over a certain
benchmark. James Altucher, Beware a Fund of Funds Relying on Gimmickry, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2006, at 12.
10. See infra Part III.
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implement rules to regulate U.S. hedge fund managers.11 However, a recent
decision, Goldstein v. SEC,12 challenged the method the SEC used to
require hedge funds to register with the SEC.13 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule requiring hedge funds to register with
the SEC.14 Though this “hedge fund rule” did not accomplish hedge fund
regulation, the debate continues: some suggest that legislative action may
be the next step to solve the perceived threat of unregulated hedge funds,
while others argue no further action to regulate hedge funds is necessary.15
This note argues that further hedge fund regulation is unnecessary and
could actually negatively affect markets. First, this note concludes that
increased regulation will not prevent system-wide market failure, and in
fact, may abridge the abilities of hedge funds to deliver proven benefits to
the economy.16 Second, the SEC should not regulate hedge fund managers
because the agency does not have the resources to effectively do so, and
hedge fund investors can adequately protect themselves since they are
generally sophisticated investors; the SEC can more effectively protect
investors by focusing on investors who are more vulnerable to market risk
and who are less able to protect themselves.17 Third, SEC regulation may
reduce hedge funds’ effectiveness and growth, and because hedge funds
have added value to financial markets, unnecessary burdens on hedge funds
should be avoided.18 Finally, this note proposes two preferable alternatives
to increased hedge fund regulation, which address regulators’ concerns over
providing investor protection and market stability, while allowing hedge
funds to operate freely: the prevention of excessive leverage by
counterparties and limiting hedge funds’ eligible investor pool.19 This note
concludes that, in the current environment, increased hedge fund regulation
should not be implemented because the potential benefits do not outweigh
the costs and potential detrimental effect that regulation will have on the
market.

11. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054
(Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Rule].
12. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
13. Rule 203(b)(3)-2 “requires investment advisers to count each owner of a ‘private fund’
towards the threshold of 14 clients for purposes of determining the availability of the private
adviser exemption of . . . the [Adviser’s] Act.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2.
14. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884.
15. See, e.g., Daniel K. Liffmann, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the Investment
Advisers Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2147, 2149 (2005) (arguing that “registration [is] the proper
method of dealing with . . . risks posed by the hedge fund industry”); Hedge Funds and
Independent Analysts: How Independent Are Their Relationship?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20–22 (2006) (statement of Joseph McLaughlin, Partner, Sidley
Austin LLP, Managed Funds Association).
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
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II. THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY AND REGULATION
The term “hedge fund” is not a technical term, nor is it legally
defined.20 The term was coined in a Fortune magazine article by Carol
Loomis about Alfred Winslow Jones, another journalist for Fortune, who
developed the idea in 1949.21 Jones had written an article called “Fashions
in Forecasting” that suggested covering long positions with short positions
to hedge bets and offset shifts in the economy.22 One definition of a hedge
fund is “any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized,
administered by professional investment managers, and not widely
available to the public.”23
Hedge funds have some distinction from their more voluminous
relative, mutual funds; hedge funds are often organized as limited
partnerships, while mutual funds are often organized as corporations.24
Mutual funds generally operate on a relative return-basis, while hedge funds
attempt to operate distinct from any benchmark, operating on an absolutereturn basis.25
Mutual funds are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(Company Act)26 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers
Act).27 Hedge funds have been able to avoid registration under both of these
acts. To avoid registration under the Company Act, hedge funds use two
exemptions. First, the Company Act defines the term “Investment
Company” as “[a company that] holds itself out as being engaged primarily,
or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or
trading in securities.”28 The statute excludes “any issuer whose outstanding
securities . . . are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons
and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public
offering of its securities.”29 And second, hedge funds are exempt from
Company Act regulation by only offering securities to “accredited
20. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
21. Carol J. Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE, 237, 237 (Apr. 1966).
22. David Skeel, In the Untamed World of Hedge Funds, Rigged Deals and Manipulated
Markets Help, 2005-DEC LEGAL AFF. 28, 30 (2005).
23. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter
WORKING GROUP REPORT].
24. See SEC DIV. OF INV. MGMT., REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES AND EXPENSES (2000),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm; IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 9 (2003) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT]. A mutual fund is an open-end company,
which is “a management company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable
security of which it is the issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (2000). A hedge fund, however, is a closedend company, which is “any management company other than an open-end company.” Id.
25. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 33.
26. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000).
27. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000).
28. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A).
29. § 80a-3 (emphasis added).
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investors,” those who meet certain financial thresholds.30 Thus, a hedge
fund can escape the Company Act classification of a mutual fund as long as
it has fewer than one-hundred beneficial owners, does not offer its securities
publicly and accepts only accredited investors.31 The Company Act also has
a slightly more general exemption for funds that are not publicly offered
and in which only “qualified purchasers” invest.32
Hedge funds have also traditionally avoided registration under the
Advisers Act, which requires registration of “investment advisers”33 in
connection with their business as “investment advisers.”34 However, this
section excludes “any investment adviser who during the course of the
preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither
holds himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts
as an investment adviser to any [registered] investment company.”35
Thus, by limiting the beneficial owners to one hundred, limiting the
number of clients to fourteen and by refraining from offering to the public,
hedge funds could traditionally avoid registration under both the Company
Act and the Advisers Act. However, the term “client” in the Advisers Act
was ambiguous; the statute did not determine whether an investment
adviser’s client was the hedge fund itself or also included the investors in
the hedge fund who are limited partners.36 And so, the applicability of the
hedge fund exemption under the Advisers Act was unclear.
In 2004, the SEC adopted a regulation defining the term “client” in its
“hedge fund rule.”37 The regulation required that “for purposes of [the
Advisers Act, hedge fund advisers] must count as clients the shareholders,
limited partners, members, or beneficiaries . . . of a private fund.”38 Thus,
although hedge funds with fewer than one hundred beneficial owners could

30. See infra Part III.B.
31. It is crucial that hedge funds avoid classification under the Company Act because this
legislation, which regulates mutual funds, would drastically limit certain hedge fund activity such
as short selling and leveraged trading. See infra Part IV.A; see also STAFF REPORT, supra note 24,
at 11–12.
32. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 12–13. Qualified purchasers can be, inter alia,
individuals or companies that have more than $5,000,000 in investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(51)(A) (2000).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2000).
“Investment adviser” means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or
who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses
or reports concerning securities.
Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2000) (emphasis added).
§ 80b-3(b)(3) (emphasis added).
See id.
17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2004).
Id.
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avoid registration under the Company Act, the hedge fund rule required
managers of funds with more than fifteen investors to register with the SEC
because the rule included investors as the clients of the investment
adviser.39
Registration under the Adviser’s Act would require that hedge funds
register with the SEC, maintain certain business records, deliver disclosure
statements to clients, and would impose a duty to fully disclose any material
conflicts the adviser has with its clients.40 Further, the rule would prohibit,
with some exception,41 a registered investment advisor from charging
performance-based fees,42 which are an integral part of a hedge fund
manager’s compensation.43
In 2005, an investment advisor, Philip Goldstein, challenged the SEC’s
regulation of hedge funds by its new definition of the term “client” in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.44 Goldstein, a hedge
fund adviser,45 challenged the rule that required him to register with the
SEC.46 The court sustained Goldstein’s challenge, holding that since an
investment adviser’s fiduciary duties are to the fund, not the investors, the
latter should not be considered clients.47 Further, the Advisers Act defines
an advisor as “any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing,
or selling securities.”48 Hedge fund managers do not advise investors
directly, but rather advise the fund, which holds assets of the investors.49
The court concluded investors cannot be included in the count of an
investment adviser’s clients.50 The SEC did not appeal the decision51 and no

39. The adviser is the manager of the hedge fund, who is the general partner of the limited
partnership. James Altucher, No Place to Hide in an Age of Transparency, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2006, at 11. (“A hedge fund is often structured as a partnership in which the manager is the
general partner and the investors are limited partners.”).
40. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 11.
41. Heightened financial requirements, investors with $750,000 invested with the adviser or
with a net worth of $1.5 million, would exempt this prohibition. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at
xii.
42. Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 696–97
(2000).
43. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 61.
44. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
45. Lynn Hume, SEC Won’t Appeal Court’s Hedge Fund Decision, THE BOND BUYER, Aug.
8, 2006, at 44. Goldstein is at Opportunity Partners LP. Id.
46. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874.
47. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2000).
49. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879–80.
50. Id. at 884.
51. Hume, supra note 45, at 44.
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further action has been taken.52 It remains to be seen whether further
legislative action will be initiated to accomplish SEC regulation of hedge
funds. But risks associated with an unregulated hedge fund market do not
seem to justify further regulator action.
III. HEDGE FUND RISKS
A. SYSTEMIC RISK: 53 AN UNREGULATED HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
DOES NOT THREATEN THE ECONOMY
1. Relevance in the Financial Markets
As hedge funds grow in number and in market share, their significance
as a part of the economy also grows. While hedge funds hold far fewer
assets than mutual funds,54 they have nonetheless proven to play a
significant role in the nation’s economy.55 One reason for this is the extreme
leverage many hedge funds use to enhance returns.56 A fund leverages its
assets by borrowing capital to invest, expecting that the return on the
borrowed capital is greater than the interest paid to borrow it.57 Since a
leveraged fund trades with assets it does not own outright, adverse
movements in the underlying fund could have widespread economic
implications capable of affecting the entire economy.58 The downfall of
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund, highlighted and
practically defined this risk.59 However, the after-effects of LTCM also
revealed the industry’s ability, through market discipline, to regulate itself.

52. Id. (“Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox announced
yesterday that the SEC will not appeal a federal appeals court’s decision to strike down its rule
requiring hedge fund advisers to register with the commission as investment advisers.”).
53. As defined in a United States General Accounting Office Report, “[s]ystemic risk is
generally defined as the risk that a disruption (at a firm, in a market segment, to a settlement
system, etc.) could cause widespread difficulties at other firms, in other market segments, or in the
financial system as a whole.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO FOCUS GREATER
ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 2 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
54. In August 2006, mutual funds held $9.59 trillion of the nation’s economy. INV. CO. INST.,
TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND INVESTING SEPTEMBER 2006 (2006), available at
http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/arctrends/trends_09_06.html. At the end of 2002, mutual funds held
$6.4 trillion in assets, INV. CO. INST., TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND INVESTING JANUARY 2003
(2003), available at http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/arctrends/trends_01_03.html, an increase of about
50% in four years. Thus, as a percentage of GDP, mutual fund assets increased from 64% to 85%
from 2002 to 2006. U.S. GDP, supra note 3.
55. See Diana B. Henriques and Joseph Kahn, Back from the Brink; Lessons of a Long, Hot
Summer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at C3.
56. Daniel K. Liffmann, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the Investment Advisers
Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2147, 2168 (2005).
57. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 37 (2003).
58. See, e.g., Henriques, supra note 55.
59. See generally Henriques, supra note 55.
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2. Hedge Fund Failures: Long-Term Capital and Amaranth
Advisors
The near-collapse of LTCM in 1998 demonstrated the risk an
unregulated hedge fund market posed to the economy. LTCM leveraged its
assets 25 times.60 Thus, of the fund’s total portfolio value, $5 billion was
from investors, while the remaining $120 billion was borrowed to enhance
returns on equity.61 Several factors threatened the collapse of LTCM,
including, significantly, a Russian threat to withhold payment of credit
obligations and a devaluation of the ruble.62 This threat sent a wave of panic
through worldwide debt markets, including countries on which LTCM had
wagered substantial leveraged capital.63 LTCM lost hundreds of millions of
dollars on junk bond exposure and on mortgage pools.64 Further, although
LTCM was primarily invested in fixed income securities, it held $6.5
billion in equity, and was hit again by declining stock prices.65
The combination of events seriously compromised LTCM’s ability to
repay the investors who had lent it $120 billion with which to trade. Its
borrowing contracts provided that upon default, all of the other lenders
could also call their loans to LTCM.66 In the end, the Federal Reserve
brokered a deal with investment banks to essentially buy out the fund and
prevent a financial disaster.67
The damage was done. A report issued by the Government Accounting
Office after LTCM’s bailout stated that the “LTCM crisis prompted strong
reactions from virtually all large firms that were counterparties of hedge
funds and an increased sense of awareness regarding risk management
policies and procedures.”68 The report also noted that accounting firm
Arthur Andersen LLP69 conducted a study which highlighted three specific
changes that occurred because of the collapse of LTCM: first, “[t]he
number of banks and securities and futures firms doing business with hedge
funds has decreased, and the business is substantially more concentrated
among the largest, globally active firms;” 70 second, “[t]hese firms have
focused on their risk management activities, including obtaining more
complete information through required data reports and on-site visits;

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at 12.
Henriques, supra note 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 13.
Arthur Andersen is now defunct for reasons unrelated to this issue. David G. Savage, High
Court Says it Wasn’t Proved that Defunct Accounting Giant Arthur Andersen Intended to Commit
a Crime in the Enron Scandal, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at A1.
70. GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 14.
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tightening credit terms and increasing margin requirements; and improving
risk models and recognizing the risks of unanticipated market events;”71 and
third, “hedge funds have become more forthcoming with meaningful data
and information ensuring greater transparency to their activities.”72 These
changes illustrate the industry’s concern for poorly managed hedge funds.
However, these changes also indicate that the LTCM crisis benefited
the market: first, since fewer banks are willing to work with hedge funds, it
will be more difficult for hedge funds to acquire dangerous levels of
leveraged capital; second, implementing internal and external controls is a
safeguard that puts the onus on investors, counterparties and the hedge fund
itself; and third, the increased transparency of hedge funds provides the
informational access to hedge funds that SEC registration would attempt to
provide.73 As opposed to increased SEC regulation, which may now only
occur through legislation, the market is already able to quickly create
incentives for hedge funds to adopt their own regulation. These built-in
market controls protect investors and the economy. SEC regulation would
be redundant if the market can already effectively regulate itself.
Amaranth Advisors (Amaranth) was another hedge fund that recently
collapsed, lending some support to proponents of hedge fund regulation;
however, the minimal impact Amaranth’s collapse had on the markets
further demonstrates that hedge fund regulation is unnecessary.74 Amaranth
invested heavily in derivatives linked to future energy prices.75 Energy
prices began to fall in September 2006, instigated by better-than-expected
weather,76 and the fund started hemorrhaging assets.77 Unable to liquidate
its positions fast enough, Amaranth lost $6.5 billion in two weeks.78 Unlike
LTCM, however, the repercussions of Amaranth’s downfall were limited
primarily to its investors.79 The derivative positions of the $9 billion fund
were sold to other investors and the rest was returned to Amaranth’s
investors.80 This collapse, however, did not threaten the economy at large.81

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 11, at 72,061.
For a general discussion on the political regulatory effects stemming from Amaranth’s
collapse, see Avital Louria Hahn, The SEC’s Last Shot at Hedge Fund Regulation, INVESTMENT
DEALERS’ DIGEST, Oct. 23, 2006.
75. Jonathan Davis, Amaranth: How to Lose $6 Billion in a Fortnight, THE SPECTATOR, Oct.
28, 2006.
76. There were fewer hurricanes than predicted that year, which kept energy prices lower than
they would have been after a severe hurricane season. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Hahn, supra note 74 (noting that “Amaranth’s loss was relatively well
contained”).
80. Davis, supra note 75.
81. See Hahn, supra note 74.
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Both LTCM and Amaranth demonstrate the potential threat that hedge
funds pose to the U.S. economy. However, neither example demonstrates
the need for hedge fund regulation because neither potential threat came to
fruition; both cases were solved without any serious harm to the economy.82
Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, recently expressed skepticism
about giving regulators more oversight, indicating that allowing hedge
funds and trading partners to manage risk in the sector made “economic
sense.”83 History shows that the market can most effectively regulate hedge
funds; efforts to regulate hedge funds to avoid systemic risk are not
currently justified.
The systemic risk posed by hedge funds has the broadest relevance, but
the SEC is also tasked with protecting investors, including hedge fund
investors.84 Investor protection does not justify increased hedge fund
regulation because hedge fund investors are a small, elite segment of the
investing public.85 Further, an inquiry must be made as to whether the SEC
is financially and tactically able to handle the diverse and complex hedge
fund industry.
B. INVESTOR RISK: REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS IS NOT A
JUSTIFIABLE SEC EXPENSE
1. The SEC is Not Equipped to Regulate Hedge Funds.
Regulating hedge funds would require the SEC to devote an unknown,
but potentially substantial, amount of additional time and money to monitor
the growing industry. There are approximately 8,000 hedge funds currently
operating in the U.S. and the number appears to be growing.86 The SEC has
a relatively small budget of $888 million,87 which is 0.036% of the U.S.
2005 fiscal year budget outlays of $2.5 trillion.88 The 3,100-employee
agency has limited resources to fulfill its mission “to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”89 The SEC already appears stretched too thin, even without a
82. Henriques, supra note 55; Davis, supra note 75.
83. Jeremy Grant, Rethink in the U.S. on Hedge Fund Rules, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at 21.
84. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
[hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate] (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.”).
85. See infra note 97.
86. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, Hedging Their Debts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 10,
2006, at 38.
87. Frequently Requested FOIA Document: SEC Budget History vs. Actual Expenses,
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2006).
88. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL
YEAR 2007 (2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/budget/tables.pdf.
89. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 84.
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commitment to implement increased hedge fund regulation.90 In 2006 the
SEC lost 155 employees and, as a result, the amount of enforcement cases
brought by the agency dropped by 9%.91 Further, the SEC had a budget
shortfall and so had to institute a hiring freeze.92 The SEC’s strained
capacity seems incapable of adjusting to the increased work-load hedge
fund regulation would create, especially when it is unclear that the
additional strain would enable the SEC to fulfill its mission to protect
investors and financial markets.
In order to be able to fulfill its mission, the SEC’s small budget
allotment must be efficiently spent; the crucial question is, whether
devoting more resources to regulate the self-regulated hedge fund industry
would be worthwhile. Of 3,100 SEC employees, only 495 are responsible
for 8,000 mutual funds owned by 91 million investors.93 A 1996 Senate
report noted that “the number of registered [mutual fund] investment
advisers has increased by over 500% since 1980, far outstripping the
growth in the Commission’s examination resources.94 As a result, smaller
investment advisers are now examined, on average, once every 44 years—
amounting to virtually no regulation at all.”95 The thinly stretched SEC may
not be able to handle an additional 8,000 hedge funds. With its budget
shortfall, it seems unlikely that the SEC is currently able to realistically
initiate a taskforce to monitor the huge hedge fund industry.
Whether the SEC’s budget would be effective in preventing an
economic collapse by regulating hedge funds is, at best, speculative. It is
not worth implementing a regulatory system that will burden hedge fund
investors both through SEC fees, and the cost of registration, which would
be paid by investors through diminished returns.96 Protecting hedge fund
investors is not a sufficient goal to justify this burden.
2. Protection of Sophisticated Investors is Unnecessary
SEC regulation over hedge funds is unnecessary for the protection of
hedge fund investors because hedge funds are made up of investors meeting
stringent financial requirements and who are presumed to be more
investment-savvy individuals. Hedge fund investors are institutions and
90. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Staff Reduced Because of Budget Crunch, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
2006, at D03.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Fiscal 2005 Appropriations Request for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chariman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
ts033104whd.htm.
94. S. Rep. No. 104-293, at 3 (1996).
95. Id.
96. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at B-1.
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accredited investors, the latter of which must have a net worth of over
$1,000,000 or have, in each of the last two years, earned more than
$200,000.97 Surely wealthy investors are no less deserving of the benefits of
government regulation, in general, but hedge funds in particular have
developed with very little regulation, and these investors have still
knowingly partaken in their success.
Also, funds of funds—investment companies that diversify risk by
buying shares in other hedge funds98 — comprise a large segment of hedge
fund assets.99 Funds of funds generally register with the SEC because their
investors are not accredited investors and because they generally have over
25 investors.100 Thus, because a large amount of capital in funds of funds is
already registered, regulating the underlying funds would be redundant
regulation. The burden of additional regulation on the hedge fund industry
could be substantial.101 The burden would likely limit the effectiveness of
hedge funds and would not likely achieve putative goals, namely preventing
malfeasance among hedge funds.
Mutual funds, which are substantially similar in form to hedge funds,102
are currently regulated by the SEC.103 Under the Company Act, mutual
funds must provide information such as the extent to which the fund intends
to engage in specific activities, a recital of all investments and their general
policies.104 Investors who seek the presumed protection of SEC regulation
can invest in any of the 8,000 registered mutual funds. Hedge funds have
been exempted from this registration, and so have been vehicles for those
who seek greater absolute returns in exchange for greater risk. Investor

97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2004). There are 2.7 million individuals in North America
who meet the $1 million net assets threshold. Press Release, Capgemini, World Wealth Report
2005 Discloses that Number of “Millionaires” Grows by Over 7% to 8.3 Million Worldwide (June
9, 2005), available at http://www.us.capgemini.com/industries/ind_pressrelease.asp?IndID=
4&ID=489. The United States population is just over 300 million. CIA: The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html.
High
net-worth
individuals, therefore, account for just under 1% of all Americans.
98. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 99.
99. Id. at 44 n.154 (“FOHFs represented approximately 27 percent of hedge fund assets,
compared to 20 percent the year before.”).
100. MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, THE SEC’S REGISTRATION PROPOSAL: THE PUBLIC
COMMENTARY—A SUMMARY 2 (2004) [hereinafter MFA PROPOSAL]; STAFF REPORT, supra note
24, at 67–69.
101. Matthew A. Chambers and Alexandra Poe, Regulatory Oversight of Hedge Fund Advisers,
1517 PRAC. LAW INST. 467, 471–77. A recent Practicing Law Institute publication suggests that
the registration requirements would be substantial. Among the types of regulation suggested are 1)
compliance programs where hedge funds would create and execute procedures to comply with
SEC rules; 2) the adoption of codes of ethics; 3) portfolio management procedures and valuation
procedures; 4) record-keeping requirements; 5) compulsory communications with investors and 6)
increased vigilance of short-selling. Id.
102. See supra Part II.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(a)–(b) (2000).
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appetite for hedge funds has not abated105 and unregulated hedge funds
should continue to be an investment option for qualified investors.
3. Hedge Fund Regulation Will Not Effectively Prevent
Malfeasance
Preventing illegal activity is not a justifiable end to be obtained by
further hedge fund regulation. SEC regulation may simplify the process of
uncovering illegal activity, but registration would not change the legal
guidelines trading firms must already follow; hedge funds would still be
subject to anti-fraud restrictions.106 For example, the hedge fund manager’s
fiduciary duty to the investors requires that managers fully disclose to their
clients all matters regarding the fund’s business practices, fees and conflicts
of interest.107
From 1999 to 2004, before the SEC implemented increased regulation,
the SEC brought 51 cases against hedge funds or their managers alleging
that they defrauded investors.108 Further, 400 funds (5% of all funds
currently operating) have been investigated by the SEC in some form.109
These non-regulatory controls have thus proven effective in uncovering and
taking action against misconduct. If the current scheme has worked to
prevent misconduct and has allowed hedge funds to operate unhindered by
regulation, there is little need to spend the time and money to implement
new, more burdensome regulation.
Further, hedge funds may more effectively self-regulate than other
investments that cater to large segments of the public. Each hedge fund
investor who has over $1 million invested110 likely has more bargaining
power (through the threat of redemption, which lowers the hedge fund’s
assets) than the average mutual fund investor, who may have far less
invested with the mutual fund manager. Fewer and more influential
investors will be a constant centripetal force on potential deviant hedge
fund activity. Investors may also control hedge fund managers by requiring
that the fund register with the SEC.111 Funds of funds executives have stated
105. See supra Part I.
106. See MFA PROPOSAL, supra note 100.
107. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at B-15 (citing Section 204 of the Investment
Advisers Act [15 USC 80b-4]).
108. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 11, at 72,056.
109. Id. at 72,057.
110. The minimum investment of most hedge funds is usually $1 to 2 million. Investor
Protection and the Regulation of Hedge Funds Advisers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of William H. Donaldson,
Chairman,
U.S.
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission),
available
at
http://edgar.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts071504whd.htm.
111. A requirement by a hedge fund investor could come in one of two ways: 1) an investor,
more likely an influential one, could explicitly require that a hedge fund manager register with the
SEC or; 2) an investor could require registration by its actions by choosing as an investment a
fund that takes the initiative to register with the SEC.
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that they declined investing with Amaranth112 because of its lack of
disclosure.113 Thus, since the market will, in some instances, provide
incentives for hedge funds to register, compulsory SEC regulation imposes
an unnecessary requirement on the hedge fund industry. Aside from the
potential ineffectiveness of hedge fund regulation, legislation that could
alter the shape of hedge funds and their place in the market could actually
be detrimental to the current system.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT FURTHER REGULATION
A. INCREASED REGULATION WILL MAKE HEDGE FUNDS A LESSATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT OPTION
1. Problems with Further Legislation
Currently, hedge funds do not have to register under either the
Company Act or the Advisers Act.114 The SEC attempted to regulate hedge
funds through the Advisers Act.115 However, it was unsuccessful in
implementing regulation because Goldstein invalidated the SEC’s
interpretation of the term “client.”116 Since the SEC is concerned with the
hedge fund’s activities and not the manager per se, the route for
implementing hedge fund regulation would logically be the Investment
Company Act, not the Investment Adviser’s Act.117 However, because the
regulation required under the Company Act is more stringent than under the
Advisers Act,118 regulation under the Company Act could over-regulate.
Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, warned about the
potential that Congress would take the opportunity to expand hedge fund
regulation beyond the purported registration requirements imposed prior to
Goldstein: “Should registration fail to achieve the intended objectives,
pressure may well become irresistible to expand the SEC’s regulatory reach
from hedge fund advisers to hedge funds themselves.”119
112. See infra Part III for a brief discussion about Amaranth.
113. Henny Sender & Gregory Zuckerman, Moving the Market—Tracking the Numbers / Street
Sleuth: Amaranth Natural-Gas Losses May Have Far-Reaching Effect—Investors in Other
Markets Could Feel Spreading Chill of 1 Week’s $5 Billion Drop, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at
C3.
114. See supra Part II.
115. Id.
116. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
117. The Company Act indicates that activities under its purview are investing, reinvesting, and
trading in securities. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a) (2000). Meanwhile, activities associated with
investment advisers are contemplated by the Advisers Act to be the advice, counsel, publications,
writings, analyses, and reports [of the advisers], 15 U.S.C. 80b-1(1) (2000).
118. See § 80a-8(b); cf. § 80b-3(c)(1)–(2).
119. Federal Reserve’s Second Monetary Policy Report for 2004: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 43 (2004) (response to a written question of
Senator Crapo from Alan Greenspan).
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The court in Goldstein further warned that the sort of regulation with
which mutual funds must comply does not comport with many hedge fund
strategies: “[Mutual funds] are . . . foreclosed from trading on margin or
engaging in short sales, and must secure shareholder approval to take on
significant debt or invest in certain types of assets, such as real estate or
commodities. These transactions are all core elements of most hedge funds’
trading strategies.”120
The cost of enacting new legislation and the cost of implementing
regulatory changes if legislation is enacted are both unclear. These costs
would fall on hedge funds to pay SEC fees and to implement registration
systems, both adding to the already high fees hedge fund investors pay.121
This could ultimately affect the desirability of hedge funds because their fee
structure would yield a lower return to hedge fund investors.122
Regulated hedge funds would be subject to more limitations than those
that are not. For example, increased regulation may consist of limits on
management fees, such as are imposed upon mutual funds.123 This may
dissuade talented hedge fund managers from starting hedge funds if the
incentive of lucrative fees is diminished by excessive regulation. Further,
because managers are beholden to their investors to make prudent and fair
investing decisions, managers who oppose duplicative SEC oversight could
move the hedge fund offshore to avoid the oversight of the SEC. Dana
Johnson, senior vice president and chief economist at Comerica Bank,
recently warned in a Wall Street Journal article that some hedge funds
would be pushed “offshore if we tried to regulate with a heavy hand. . . . [It
is b]etter to have them onshore with light regulation.”124
2. Benefits of Hedge Funds’ Distinctness from Mutual Funds
Hedge funds have delivered numerous benefits to the global financial
markets. Hedge funds invest in new and often undercapitalized markets.125
This enhances liquidity in less traditional markets. Hedge funds also often
purchase derivatives126 and take short positions,127 which increases
120. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875 (citation omitted).
121. Hedge funds typically charge 1-5% of assets under management in management fees and
an additional performance fee, based on returns, that can range from 10-40%. David Reilly,
Moving the Market—Tracking the Numbers / Street Sleuth: Breaking the Trend to Higher Fees —Will Hedge-Fund Industry Follow U.K. Firm as It Cuts What It Charges Clients?, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 22, 2005, at C3.
122. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at B-1.
123. See id. at 3.
124. Phil Izzo, Moving the Market: Economists See Hedge-Fund Risks—Survey Indicates
Concerns About a Lack of Oversight, Use of Borrowed Money, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2006, at C3.
125. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 4–5.
126. A derivative is “[a] financial instrument whose characteristics and value depend upon the
characteristics and value of an underlier, typically a commodity, bond, equity or currency.”
Investorwords.com, http://www.investorwords.com/1421/derivative.html (last visited Dec. 21,
2006).
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reliability to market prices and may limit irrational security appreciation.128
As Joseph McLaughlin, a partner at Sidley Austin, LLP, testified before the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
Hedge funds enhance market liquidity and contribute to pricing efficiency
and market stability. Hedge funds also foster financial innovation and risk
sophistication among the market participants with which they deal. . . .
[H]edge funds’ ability to deliver these benefits to the financial
marketplace depends in large measure on their ability to engage in short
sales and related activities.129

The putative benefits of hedge fund regulation do not justify a new
scheme of regulation of an industry that, at its core, has been distinguished
from other investments by its lack of regulation. Hedge funds have
provided value to financial markets. Removing attributes that distinguish
hedge funds and mutual funds may eliminate an environment where
wealthy investors have allowed managers to invest in new and risky
markets.130 Talented managers may be dissuaded from starting funds, or
from personally investing in the funds they manage.131 Investors may find
new vehicles in which to invest that are more distinct from mutual funds.
Dressing hedge funds up as mutual funds by imposing strict regulation will
hinder investing innovation and will reduce the benefits hedge funds have
provided to the economy.
Hedge funds are a concept defined by what they are not.132 As the SEC
tightens its regulatory hold on hedge funds, a major distinction between
hedge funds and mutual funds begins to vanish. Wealthy investors who
formerly favored hedge funds over mutual funds for the unique opportunity
of a cutting-edge investment will find new ways to distinguish themselves
from ordinary investors.
With regulation foreseeably driving away wealthy investors, areas of
the market in which hedge funds invest may become undercapitalized.
Hedge funds invest in a wide array of securities and take varying positions.
For example, hedge funds invest in the second-lien loan market and in
corporate bankruptcies.133 Hedge funds have also increasingly been a major
127. Taking a short position means “[b]orrowing a security (or commodity futures contract)
from a broker and selling it, with the understanding that it must later be bought back (hopefully at
a
lower
price)
and
returned
to
the
broker.”
Investorwords.com,
http://www.investorwords.com/4556/sell_a_stock_short.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
128. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
129. Hedge Funds and Independent Analysts: How Independent Are Their Relationship?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Joseph
McLaughlin, Partner, Sidley Austin LLP, Managed Funds Association).
130. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
131. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at A-1.
132. See supra Part II.
133. Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2006, at A1.
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creditor to numerous markets from retail to technology to the automotive
sectors, providing much-needed capital and reducing lending costs.134
Markets that might otherwise go unfunded are capitalized by hedge funds
willing to take risk in these markets for the potential upside benefit. Further,
hedge funds often hedge their portfolios by trading both long and short
positions.135 Increased hedge fund regulation could disrupt trade strategies
and encourage a precipitous flow of capital out of hedge funds and out of
the markets they support.
By making hedge funds indistinguishable from mutual funds, regulation
could also have a deleterious effect on hedge fund managers’ participation
in their funds. While hedge fund managers are notoriously well paid, with
top earners earning $1 billion or more in a year,136 they also invest
substantial assets of their own in the funds they manage,137 which may
induce investor confidence in their vested managers. When hedge fund
managers are invested in their own fund, they are naturally less likely to
engage in dubious or even fraudulent trading. Overly burdensome
regulation could have two primary effects: 1) managers may refrain from
starting hedge funds; or 2) managers may refrain from investing in their
own fund. Increased legislation, therefore, could negatively impact the role
of the autonomous hedge fund manager and hamper hedge fund growth in
the U.S.
Further, while the American hedge fund industry is currently the
biggest in the world, hedge fund activity in Hong Kong and London has
grown rapidly.138 While London and Hong Kong have smaller hedge fund

In this market, if a borrower defaults, the primary lender gets repaid before the
secondary lender; in exchange for shouldering this risk, that second-lien lender earns a
higher interest rate from the borrower. . . . Hedge funds have also grown prominent in
corporate bankruptcies, where they can make a cheap bet on a company’s recovery by
buying its debt.
Id.

134. Roane, supra note 86, at 38.
135. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 33–34. By taking short positions hedge funds sell a
security loaned to it and then have to buy it back later to cover that loan. The short seller, hopes
for a depreciation in market value so it can buy the security back at a lower price, pocketing the
difference. Short Sales, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).
A short sale is generally the sale of a stock you do not own. Investors who sell short
believe the price of the stock will fall. If the price drops, you can buy the stock at the
lower price and make a profit. If the price of the stock rises and you buy it back later at
the higher price, you will incur a loss.
Id.

136. Adam Shell, $363M Is Average Pay for Top Hedge Fund Managers, USA TODAY, May
26, 2006, at 1B.
137. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at A-1.
138. See Heather Timmons, New York Isn’t the World’s Undisputed Financial Capital, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at C1; Stephen Schurr, Hedge Funds: London Wins Prize for Nurturing
Fast-rising Star, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006.
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markets than the U.S., both economies (and others, like Singapore and
Australia) compete for economic freedom; Hong Kong and Singapore are
considered more economically free by the Index of Economic Freedom and
the U.K. ranks number six, behind the U.S. at number four.139 Further,
Hong Kong, U.K., Ireland, Luxembourg, Estonia, The Netherlands,
Belgium and Germany are all considered more free specifically in terms of
“investment freedom” than the U.S.140 The Index of Economic Freedom is a
publication by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal that
ranks countries’ economic freedom using several criteria, including the
amount of governmental regulation.141 The report notes in its methodology
that “[h]eavy bank regulation reduces opportunities and restricts economic
freedom.”142 Already lagging in its ability to foster investment freedom,
increased hedge fund regulation in the U.S. could create a less desirable
environment in which to foster hedge fund growth, driving hedge funds
abroad. Illustrative of this effect is a recent SEC decision to deregulate
certain Sarbanes-Oxley requirements by loosening auditing requirements
and making foreign companies’ withdrawals from American markets
easier.143 The SEC deregulated for fear that its regulatory reach would
hamper investment in the U.S.144 Similarly, overregulation of hedge funds
could negatively impact the desirability of the U.S. market.
The SEC has claimed regulation would have minimal effects on hedge
funds,145 but because its attempt to work around the existing bars to hedge
fund registration was invalidated,146 the next step is likely legislation.
Congress could take the opportunity, for simplicity’s sake, to revamp
existing laws to include hedge funds within the same realm of mutual fund
regulation. Increased regulatory oversight would likely be a result of further
legislative action, which would negatively affect the hedge fund industry
and could result in instability in financial markets.
V. PROPOSALS TO LIMIT HEDGE FUND RISK
1. PREVENT EXCESSIVE LEVERAGE THROUGH HEDGE FUND
COUNTERPARTIES
One problem that seems to be common among the financial risks
associated with hedge funds is excess leverage. An un-leveraged hedge
139. TIM KANE ET AL., THE 2007 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 9 (2007), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads/Index2007.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 40–50.
142. Id. at 47.
143. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Eases Regulations On Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at
C1.
144. Id.
145. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 11, at 72,054.
146. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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fund poses a risk only to investors, who can lose their invested capital. An
un-leveraged hedge fund may not be practical for many funds, though,
because leveraging can be an effective way to capitalize on interest-rate
arbitrage. However, the more a fund is leveraged, the more volatile the risk
becomes.147 Excessive leverage is a problem not only to hedge fund
investors, but to banks as well, since the banks risk losing the credit they
have extended if a hedge fund cannot pay.
In response to the LTCM collapse in 1999, Patrick Parkinson, Associate
Director of Division of Research and Statistics at the Federal Reserve
testified before Congress that the
primary responsibility for addressing the weaknesses in risk management
practices that were evident in the LTCM episode rests with the private
financial institutions—a relatively small number of U.S. and foreign banks
and broker-dealers, most of which were LTCM’s counterparties. . . .
[P]rudential supervisors and regulators have a responsibility to help to
ensure that the processes that banks and securities firms utilize to manage
risk are commensurate with the size and complexity of their portfolios and
responsive to changes in financial market conditions.148

Similarly, a joint report by the Department of the Treasury, The Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the SEC and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission indicated that the most effective way to contain
excess leverage was not by regulating hedge funds, but through the
discipline of hedge fund counterparties, such as the banks who lend hedge
funds capital with which to invest.149 Significantly, the report goes on to
note that while these disciplinary controls will not always be effective (for
example in the case of LTCM), “the failures and losses that have occurred
have been small relative to the benefits of a market economy.”150
147. For example, hedge fund A is leveraged five times, $100 million in invested capital and
$400 million borrowed at 5% annualized interest. Hedge fund B is leveraged twenty-five times,
$100 million in invested capital and $2.4 billion borrowed at 5% interest. At the end of one year,
hedge fund A will owe its creditor $420 million. On a $500 million investment, hedge fund A
would have to lose over 16% in one year to default on the loans. (A 16% loss on $500 million
brings the value to $420 million, the amount borrowed owed to the creditor. This scenario
assumes that all of the investors would lose every penny. While this outcome is undesirable, it
only directly affects the individual investors, so for the purposes of this example will be
considered irrelevant.) On the other hand, hedge fund B has less cushion for failure. At the end of
the year, hedge fund B will owe its creditor $2.52 billion. On an investment of $2.5 billion, hedge
fund B has to earn at least 0.8% on the portfolio just to service the debt, assuming that all
investors are completely wiped out. To service the debt and to allow the investors to break even
on their investments, the fund would have to return 4.8% of its portfolio value.
148. Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of
Patrick M. Parkinson, Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/testimony/1999/19990506.htm.
149. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at 34. Counterparties are banks and other
entities with which hedge funds trade and borrow. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 26.
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Kurt Schacht, Managing Director of Chartered Financial Analyst
Institute noted that “greater disclosure by regulated counterparty entities . . .
will reveal any serious imbalances in a market” and that U.K. authorities are
also looking at ways to prevent systemic risk by more closely regulating the
counterparties who they already regulate.151 Of the parties who contribute to
excessive leverage, banks and other counterparties, which are already
regulated, seem to be the most efficient party to monitor.
2. INCREASE REQUIREMENTS FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS
A possible alternative to further regulation under the federal securities
laws is to update the requirement one must meet to be an accredited
investor. Currently accredited investors include those that earn over
$200,000 a year or have over $1 million in net worth.152 These numbers
were formulated over twenty years ago and are outdated.153 The number of
people meeting this threshold has increased significantly because of
inflation.154 Thus, those eligible to invest in hedge funds are more in
number and less wealthy than those of twenty years ago in real terms.
Hedge funds can be successful in an unregulated market when their
investors are sophisticated enough to be an effective counterpart to the
hedge fund manager. Sophisticated investors require less assistance from
the SEC to protect their investments. Further, wealthy investors may be
more willing to risk their investment for non-market-correlative returns.
This allows for more complex or cutting-edge investments, which, as noted
above, adds liquidity to the market.
The definition of an accredited investor should be raised, at least to
reflect inflation over the last twenty years. This will limit the number of
people who are able to invest in an unregulated hedge fund market and will
also keep the hedge fund industry nimble and efficient.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hedge funds have become omnipresent across equity and bond markets,
have become active in less-traditional derivative and arbitrage strategies,
and have invested in retail, automotive and even the entertainment

151. The Role of Hedge Funds in Our Capital Markets: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Securities and Investment, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Kurt Schacht, Executive Director,
CFA Center for Financial Market Integrity).
152. See supra note 97.
153. The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing Market Risk:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of The Hon. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission) (“The monetary amounts used to determine accredited
investor status essentially have remained the same since 1982.”).
154. Id. (“[M]ore investors meet this standard, despite recent economic downturns.”).
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industry.155 Hedge funds have enjoyed incredible growth, especially at the
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first.156 With
well over $1 trillion floating through the industry, the odds of financial risk
would seem naturally to increase. Indeed, hedge funds have shown some
potential to harm the economy and individual investors, but whether there is
an appropriate way to stem these risks has not been proven.
Most hedge funds have avoided regulation under the federal securities
laws. As the hedge fund industry has grown in size and in potential risk to
the economy, the SEC has become increasingly concerned that it should act
to prevent serious harm. It promulgated its hedge fund rule designed to
bring hedge funds under its regulatory reach even though it seemed clear
that the authorizing statute did not authorize it to take this measure.
The U.S. Court of Appeals invalidated the SEC’s faulty hedge fund
rule.157 With no further action since, a likely next step is legislation, should
Congress decide hedge fund regulation is necessary. There are two
problems that further legislation which implements hedge fund regulation
could pose. One, this legislation could over-regulate and hinder hedge
funds’ growth and effectiveness. Over-regulation would be detrimental to
the economy because it would deprive the economy of the benefits hedge
funds have provided through their aggressive and innovative trading
strategies. Two, the legislation could be interminably time-consuming and
expensive, yet still prove to be ineffective.
Hedge fund investors are limited to those who are presumed to be
sophisticated investors. Sophisticated investors are more able to protect
their investments from errant hedge fund managers and also have the power
to control managers through the threat of redemptions of large amounts of
capital from the fund. Further, hedge funds are already subject to anti-fraud
regulations. Enforcement against hedge funds has proved workable in the
current self-regulated environment.
The benefits of increased regulation are dubious and over-regulation
could hinder hedge funds’ ability to add value to the economy. The costs
associated with implementation and execution of an unknown regulatory
environment is not justified.
Excessive hedge fund leverage can magnify losses to extreme levels.
The counterparty banks that lend hedge funds money should be restrained
from making excessive and potentially dangerous loans. Further, hedge
funds have operated in a mostly unregulated market because they have only
155. For example, unnamed hedge funds apparently negotiated recently with actor Tom Cruise
and his business partner Paula Wagner, to invest upwards of $100 million after the outspoken
Scientologist actor was fired from Viacom’s movie studio, Paramount Pictures. Merissa Marr &
Kate Kelly, For Hedge Funds, Backing Cruise Could Prove to Be a Risky Business, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 24, 2006, at A1.
156. See supra Part I.
157. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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accepted institutional and wealthy investors. This ensures that the investors
are sophisticated enough to handle an unregulated investment, and also that
hedge fund investors will have enough influence to effectively monitor
hedge fund managers. Hopefully, this will prevent malfeasance. The
financial requirements of investors eligible to invest in hedge funds should
thus be strengthened to reflect inflation over the last twenty years.
Since the current hedge fund regulatory scheme has worked
successfully and has benefited the economy, it should be untouched. Private
hedge funds should be able to interact with their private investors without
regulatory interference. To encourage innovation and effectiveness, the
hedge fund industry should not currently be regulated by the SEC.
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